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ACCOUNTABILITY AND DECISION MAKING IN AUTONOMOUS 
WARFARE: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE? 
 
Amos N. Guiora* 
 
Abstract 
Who is the enemy? How can you distinguish between the 
civilians and the noncivilians? The same people who come and 
work in the bases at daytime, they just want to shoot and kill you 
at nighttime. So how can you distinguish between the two? The 
good or the bad? All of them looked the same.1 
	
This Article addresses the use of autonomous weapons systems 
(“AWS”). This Article only concerns itself with AWS used for offensive 
purposes. That is distinct from defensive weapons systems, including 
Israel’s Iron Dome2 and U.S. missile defense systems.3 Similarly, this 
Article does not address use of AWS for purposes of neutralizing 
Improvised Explosive Devices (“IED”) or evacuating a wounded soldier. 
The use of AWS potentially minimizes risks to soldiers—at least in 
the short term. It suggests sleek technology. The dead are a hazy visual on 
a screen. It is antiseptic, as neither the smell of burning flesh nor the sound 
of agony can be heard by those programming the AWS or those sitting 
behind a screen observing the effects of a “hit.” Autonomous warfare has 
also been positively portrayed in Hollywood movies; technological 
sophistication inherently possesses an undeniable “cool” factor that is 
engaging, engrossing, and compelling. However, the positive lens with 
which it is viewed through Hollywood is a limited glimpse of its role. 
Weapons created for the purpose of autonomously determining when 
the nation-state can kill a human being raises profoundly important 
questions regarding humanity, ethics, and defense. While the use of force 
																																																						
* © 2017 Amos N. Guiora. Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University 
of Utah. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European 
Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Agreement (FP/2007-
2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n. [340956]. Many thanks to Dapo Akande, David Irvine, 
Sophia Khan, Stephanie Lewis, David Rodin, Amanda Roosendaal, Heather Roff, Derek 
Smith, Soumaya Sahla, and Jennifer Welsh for their insightful and constructive comments 
and feedback of previous drafts. 
1 MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUR HOURS IN MY LAI 74 (1992).   
2 See Israel Defense Forces: Iron Dome Missile Defense System, JEWISH VIRTUAL 
LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/IronDome.html [https://perma.cc/ 
5YAP-44BG]. 
3 See U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Aug. 17, 
2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/usmissiledefense [https://perma.cc/VDE5-
58DN].  
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by the nation-state is regulated, whether by international law or rules of 
engagement, the introduction of AWS challenges the notion of whether—
and at what point—proposed decision making should be removed from 
human control and judgment. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of AWS is an issue of great and pressing significance. While for some 
it is but a figment of their imagination, reality suggests otherwise: “Most technical 
experts . . . assume that it is only a matter of time before such systems are 
operational. The US Department of Defense has drawn up an official plan to develop 
and bring into service autonomous systems increasingly up to 2038.”4  
There is, then, great urgency in this discussion. The question, in its starkest 
form, is whether “kill” decisions should be made by man or machine. The decision 
is distinct from the implementation. The question is whether nation-states should 
adopt weapons systems whereby “human life would be devalued if life and death 
decisions were ceded to a machine.”5  
My primary objections to AWS are two-fold: (i) accountability and (ii) 
removing humans from use of force decision making. These two concerns were 
addressed in an Open Letter signed by 1,000 leading Artificial Intelligence and 
Robotics Researchers. The concerns articulated below reflect my profound 
discomfort with AWS: 
 
Autonomous weapons select and engage targets without human 
intervention. They might include, for example, armed quadcopters that can 
search for and eliminate people meeting certain pre-defined criteria, but 
do not include cruise missiles or remotely piloted drones for which humans 
make all targeting decisions. Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has 
reached a point where the deployment of such systems is — practically if 
not legally — feasible within years, not decades, and the stakes are high: 
autonomous weapons have been described as the third revolution in 
warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms. 
Many arguments have been made for and against autonomous 
weapons, for example that replacing human soldiers by machines is good 
by reducing casualties for the owner but bad by thereby lowering the 
threshold for going to battle. The key question for humanity today is 
whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting.  
 
																																																						
4 ROBIN GEISS, THE INTERNATIONAL-LAW DIMENSON OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
SYSTEMS 4 (2015) http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/11673.pdf [https://perma.cc/C29G-
DHK9]; Chris Cole, BAE Systems Pushing Ahead with Autonomous Drone Targeting, 
DRONE WARS UK (Nov. 6, 2016), https://dronewars.net/2016/06/11/bae-systems-pushing-
ahead-with-autonomous-drone-targeting/ [https://perma.cc/6MEU-3FMN].  
5 GEISS, supra note 4. 
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If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon 
development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable, and the endpoint 
of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will 
become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. Unlike nuclear weapons, they 
require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become 
ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce.  
It will only be a matter of time until they appear on the black market 
and in the hands of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control their 
populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing, etc. 
Autonomous weapons are ideal for tasks such as assassinations, 
destabilizing nations, subduing populations and selectively killing a 
particular ethnic group. We therefore believe that a military AI arms race 
would not be beneficial for humanity. There are many ways in which AI 
can make battlefields safer for humans, especially civilians, without 
creating new tools for killing people.6 
 
This Article reflects my own personal experience while serving in the Israel Defense 
Forces Judge Advocate General Corps. 
Examining future application of AWS requires distinguishing from present-day 
Drone Warfare (“DW”). The two, while arguably similar, have significant 
differences. They are not to be confused: AWS reflects minimizing human decision 
making; DW is predicated on human decision making. 
While the primary, current use of DW is by nation-states engaged in operational 
counterterrorism, it can be similarly applied in traditional war between nation-states. 
One does not come at the expense of the other; one does not negate the other. This 
Article assumes AWS can be used in both.  
To address these issues, this Article is divided into five sections. First, I give 
an overview of autonomous warfare systems and drone warfare. Second, I discuss 
international law and decision making. Third, I review the current implementation 
of legal standards in practice. Fourth, I recommend solutions for ensuring 
compliance. Finally, I conclude. 
 
I.  AUTONOMOUS WARFARE SYSTEMS AND DRONE WARFARE: AN OVERVIEW 
 
“Autonomous warfare” does not have a universal, much less unanimous, 
definition. The fact that there are so many definitions is indicative of the uncertainty 
surrounding this developing means of warfare. One definition of an “autonomous 
																																																						
6 Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers, FUTURE OF 
LIFE INST. (July 28, 2015),  http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons 
[https://perma.cc/6MEU-3FMN]. 
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system” is “a machine, whether hardware or software, that, once activated, performs 
some task or function on its own.”7  
Another definition states that a truly autonomous system “must be capable of 
independently interpreting higher-level intent and direction then analysing its 
physical and operational context in order to make decisions and act independent of 
further human influence.”8  
The definition used in this Article defines AWS as weapons systems that 
identify and attack without any direct human control.9 This definition crystalizes the 
essence of autonomous warfare; the lack of direct human control is the basis for the 
deep skepticism expressed in this Article.  
The seeming benefits of AWS are understandable and largely self-explanatory. 
The concerns—perhaps hesitation—that I seek to convey in this Article focus on 
minimizing human involvement in the decision to attack with the intent to kill 
another human being. That is relevant to both forms of the use of force, traditional 
warfare, and operational counterterrorism.  
My experience in operational counterterrorism reflects heavy reliance on 
checklists. The essence of checklists is human analysis of distinct decision points 
reflecting both tactical and strategic considerations. Nuance is at the core of the 
decision-making process. Sensitivity to an extraordinarily wide range of decision 
points demands standards of accountability for consequences arising from an attack.  
While the commander’s decision should incorporate as much information as 
possible from as many sources as possible, reflecting multiple vectors and variables, 
the real-time decision whether to engage an individual must rest in the commander’s 
hands. President Harry S. Truman’s classic phrase “the buck stops here” is the 
ultimate manifestation of command. A weapons system devoid of human decision 
making must raise serious—and legitimate—doubts regarding its legality and 
morality.   
According to the Human Rights Watch report “Losing Humanity: The Case 
Against Killer Robots”:  
 
[R]obots are essentially machines that have the power to sense and act 
based on how they are programmed. They all possess some degree of 
autonomy, which means the ability of a machine to operate without human 
																																																						
7 Paul Scharre & Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems 5 (Feb. 13, 2015) (working paper), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-
introduction-to-autonomy-in-weapon-systems [https://perma.cc/PC7N-S6B3]. 
8 Jim Bledon, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Humanity’s Best Hope?, LEADING 
EDGE: AIRPOWER IN THEORY & PRAC. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://leadingedgeairpower.com/20 
15/09/01/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-humanitys-best-hope/ [https://perma.cc/F5X 
T-BXR3]. 
9 See Autonomous Weapons Systems – Q & A, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Nov. 
12, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapon-systems-challenge-
human-control-over-use-force [https://perma.cc/7LVZ-H4WG] (stating that “[a]utonomous 
weapon systems . . . independently search for, identify and attack targets without human 
intervention”).  
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supervision. The exact level of autonomy can vary greatly. Robotic 
weapons, which are unmanned, are often divided into three categories 
based on the amount of human involvement in their actions: 
 
• Human-in-the Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver 
force only with a human command; 
• Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and 
deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override 
the robots’ actions; and 
• Human-out-of-the Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting 
targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction.10 
 
My primary concern is the “out of the loop” paradigm; however, I wish to raise a 
voice of concern regarding both “in the loop” and “on the loop.” The concern reflects 
the troubling  reality regarding the speed of technological advancement and 
development. Breaking the paradigms “in,” “on,” and “out” into their distinct 
variables highlights the necessity of focusing on five particular terms: humans, 
AWS, robots, target selection, and force delivery. The concept of “speed” is essential 
to this discussion because the narrowing of the deliberation window, between 
decision to implementation, is a prime component of AWS.  
There is great danger in this, particularly when human decision making is 
removed from the process. Human decision making reflects consideration, 
deliberation, reflection, and doubt;11 the ultimate manifestation of AWS is machine 
selection-force delivery devoid of human involvement. The sensitivity, nuance, and 
ability to reconsider a decision reflects daily human conduct. That is of particular 
importance and relevance when the decision at hand is whether to kill another human 
being. The following highlights the complexity of the decision-making process and 
the requirement that accountability be an integral part of the process. 
In 1992, Abbas Moussaka, leader of Hizbollah at the time, and his wife and 
children were killed by missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter while driving a car 
in Lebanon.12 
According to news reports, the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”) had identified 
Moussaka as a legitimate target. However, when the decision was made to 
																																																						
10 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH., 
LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 2 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/ 
report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots https://www.hrw.org/report/ 
2015/04/09/mind-gap/lack-accountability-killer-robots [https://perma.cc/2YK5-3G4S]; 
Geoffrey S. Corn, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing the Inevitability of “Taking the 
Man Out of the Loop” 21 (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files 
/3894-corn-understanding-the-loop-regulating-the-next [https://perma.cc/L68H-G4VQ]. 
11 For a fascinating, important and in-depth discussion of this issue, see DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING,  FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
12 Mitchell Prothero, Hisbollah Positions Nasrallah’s Successor, THE NATIONAL (Oct. 
23, 2008), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/hizbollah-positions-
nasrallahs-successor [https://perma.cc/W6WZ-PNHM].  
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implement the planned attack, it was realized that his children were traveling with 
him. The question was whether to continue with the planned attack. The decision 
was made, in accordance with a limited operational window of opportunity and 
given the threat he posed, to strike Moussaka regardless. The decision was the 
subject of public discussion in Israel. What is important for the purpose of this 
Article is that the decision to go forth—regardless of the known collateral damage—
was made by senior military commanders who fully understood its ramifications and 
consequences. There was the possibility, in accordance with their decision-making 
process, to cancel the operation. That is distinct from the “out of the loop” paradigm, 
devoid of reversibility of decisions made and accountability for their consequences. 
Similarly, the issue of accountability is of great importance. It goes without 
saying that all decisions have ramifications. In the military context, commanders and 
soldiers whose decisions result in misdeed—from the mundane to the grave—are 
subject to disciplinary sanctions and court martials. Commanders may suffer career-
ending consequences.  
That is the essence of consequential decision making; a system devoid of 
accountability is in direct contrast to the profession of arms. There is a direct 
relationship between decision making and accountability. “Kill/not kill” decisions 
authorized by the nation-state where standards of accountability are neither inherent 
nor integral is akin to authorizing the new Wild West. 
In the “in” paradigm, human command is necessary for target selection and 
force delivery. In the “on” model, AWS can target and deliver, but humans can 
override an AWS’s action. And in the “out” model, AWS can target and deliver 
without any any available recourse for human operators.  
Presently, there appears to be a transition from an “in” to an “on” paradigm, 
with the “out” process reflecting the trajectory of autonomous warfare research. 
Given this direction of research and resources, it can be presumed with a reasonable 
degree of certainty that future autonomous warfare developments will pursue 
adoption and implementation of the “out” paradigm. 
The legitimacy of a military action by the nation-state demands that 
accountability be integral to its undertaking. This is particularly apt when the 
intention is to kill a human being. The decision to do so must not be casually 
undertaken. Accordingly, developing clear accountability standards and criteria is 
essential. The loop categories are relevant because they articulate the limits of 
autonomous warfare. Needless to say, accountability incorporates clear standards of 
legality and morality.   
The discussion of limits is directly related to the evolution of autonomous 
warfare, the construction of AWS, the programming of autonomous weapons, and 
the extent to which commanders will control the implementation of AWS, either in 
traditional warfare or operational counterterrorism. Limits to the use of force are 
relevant both to present application of autonomous warfare and the future 
implementation of autonomous systems. The importance of limits cannot be 
sufficiently emphasized. 
Predicated on my experience, all three paradigms cause me concern—primarily 
because I am not convinced of the articulation and application of limits with respect 
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to the definition of imminence, the definition of legitimate target, and the application 
of force. These three uncertainties are of extraordinary importance in a paradigm 
where human decision making and command accountability are minimized.  
A minimization of human decision making and accountability is the inevitable 
result of the transition from the “in” to the “out” paradigm. The combination of both 
minimizations—if not eviscerations—has profoundly significant consequences 
regarding the limits of application. Rearticulated, the “out” model suggests that 
limits on imminence, targets, and power will be cast asunder.  
There is a very real probability that the attempt to calculate and quantify the 
imminence, targets, and power, will create a nonhuman vector of decision making 
capable of calculating significantly amoral judgments. The ramifications are 
extraordinarily disturbing, posing significant questions regarding the nature of future 
military engagement. Analysis of the three categories highlights the requirement to 
question the legitimacy, legality, and morality of autonomous warfare.  
Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley wrote: “For some types of target sets in 
relatively uncluttered environments, it is already possible to build systems that can 
identify, target and engage enemy forces, although current DOD guidelines direct 
that a human be in the loop for offensive lethal force decisions.”13  
If autonomous warfare accomplishes the following three goals, then opposition 
to its increased use is, seemingly, illogical and counter-intuitive: (i) minimal loss of 
life to soldiers, (ii) minimal collateral damage, and (iii) enhanced accuracy regarding 
the specifically identified target. 
All three goals, individually and collectively, are laudable, legitimate, and 
defensible. What national security decision maker would not favor enhanced use of 
AWS if these are the results? What politician would not tout their effectiveness and 
laud their success to a national public? What public would discourage enhanced use 
if autonomous warfare ensures that the “bad guys” get killed and the “good guys” 
are safe?  
If drones are increasingly the weapons of choice in contemporary 
counterterrorism, then, according to its advocates, AWS are the future weapons of 
choice. However, caveats are important since establishing boundaries is essential to 
ensuring legitimacy. In February 2013, a Department of Justice White Paper entitled 
“Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior 
Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force”14 was leaked to the press. 
The White Paper is the clearest articulation of the Obama Administration’s Drone 
Policy.   
																																																						
13 ROBERT O. WORK & SHAWN BRIMLEY, 20YY: PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE ROBOTIC 
AGE 24 (2014). 
14 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST 
A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED 
FORCE 1 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ White Paper], http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/ 
sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW8E-CR2Y]. 
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Widely criticized,15 the White Paper states the following:  
 
[T]he United States would be able to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen, 
who is located outside the United States and is an operational leader 
continually planning attacks against U.S. persons and interests, in at least 
the following circumstances: (1) where an informed, high-level official of 
the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an 
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) where a 
capture operation would be infeasible—and where those conducting the 
operation continue to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) 
where such an operation would be conducted consistent with applicable 
law of war principles.16 
 
The concern with the White Paper regarding autonomous warfare focuses on two 
critical terms, imminence and legitimate target. According to the White Paper, 
imminence pertaining to a legitimate target is defined as follows:  
 
[T]he condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of 
violent attack against the United States does not require the United States 
to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests 
will take place in the immediate future.17 
 
How both terms are defined and applied in real time—when operational decision 
making is fraught with danger and tension—is of critical importance. The Obama 
Administration’s definitions are of great concern because they enable a drone policy 
devoid of strict limits and narrow criteria. Possible application of that model to AWS 
raises grave concern.  
The Obama Administration’s policy has been the subject of much scrutiny and 
criticism.18 Nevertheless, the decisions are made by humans, whether located in a 
																																																						
15 Michael T. Geary & Ryan Mihalyak, US Presidential Authority and Domestic Drone 
Missile Strikes, 8 HOMELAND SECURITY REV. 237, 237 (2014); David Kaye, International 
Law Issues in the Department of Justice White Paper on Targeted Killing, 17 AM. SOC’Y OF 
INT’L L., Feb.15, 2013, at 4, https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight130215.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VV3E-6RW9]; Claire Pritchard, Finger on the Joystick: A Drone Expert 
Weighs in on American Policy, CHI. POL’Y REV. (Mar. 8, 2013), http://chicagopolicyreview. 
org/2013/03/08/finger-on-the-joystick-a-drone-expert-on-americas-controversial-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/CR8D-4CLF]. 
16 DOJ White Paper, supra note 14, at 6.  
17 Id. at 7. 
18 Marie Aronsson, Remote Law-Making? American Drone Strikes and the 
Development of Jus Ad Bellum, 1 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L. 273, 273–98 (2014); William 
Funk, Deadly Drones, Due Process, and the Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 311, 334–36 (2013); Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All 
Out of Proportion, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 235, 255–57 (2012); Trevor McCrisken, 
Obama’s Drone War, 55 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRATEGY 97, 104 (2013); Jake 
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U.S. military installation in Nevada or overseas. Those making the decisions are, 
literally, operating the much discussed “joy stick” whilst significantly removed from 
the actual battlefield or killing zone.  
Nevertheless, the “kill/not kill” decision is not made by machine. Much 
literature has addressed how involvement in DW impacts operators;19 similarly, 
research has also focused on how DW impacts communities whose members have 
been targeted by drones.20  
The drone discussion is of particular relevance in examining autonomous 
warfare for the following reason: Criticism of drone policy focuses on the broad 
articulation of the legitimate target and imminence while implemented by humans. 
Autonomous warfare, on the other hand, seeks to remove humans from the decision-
making loop while applying broad standards devoid of human intervention and 
control. 
On July 1, 2016 the Obama Administration released statistics regarding U.S. 
drone policy. The assessment below by the New York Times reflects the very 
concern this paper seeks to emphasize—the “normalization” of drone attacks 
combined with terms that beg precise definition, much less consistent 
implementation with clear standards of accountability. If that is the case with drones 
																																																						
William Rylatt, An Evaluation of the U.S. Policy of “Targeted Killing” Under International 
Law: The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi (Part I), 44 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 39, 52 (2014); Amitai 
Etzioni, The Great Drone Debate, MILITARY REV., Apr. 1, 2013, 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430
_art004.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR2A-ESLK]; Jane Mayer, Torture and Obama’s Drone 
Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2013, http://www.sennhs.org/ourpages/auto/2015/5/19/ 
65556542/Torture%20and%20Obama_s%20Drone%20Program%20by%20Jane%20Mayer
_2_15_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWN2-UELH]. 
19 James Dao, Drone Pilots Are Found to Get Stress Disorders as Much as Those in 
Combat Do, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/drone-
pilots-found-to-get-stress-disorders-much-as-those-in-combat-do.html [https://perma.cc/UZ 
22-VTX7]; Rebecca Hawkes, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Is Higher in Drone 
Operators, TELEGRAPH (May 30, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/hay-
festival/11639746/Post-traumatic-stress-disorder-is-higher-in-drone-operators.html 
[https://perma.cc/2ADT-FQ2X]; Denise Chow, Drone Wars: Pilots Reveal Debilitating 
Stress Beyond Virtual Battlefield, LIVE SCIENCE (Nov. 5, 2013) http://www.livescience.com/ 
40959-military-drone-war-psychology.html [https://perma.cc/L4TU-ML6C]; Dan 
Gettinger, Burdens of War: PTSD and Drone Crews, CTR. FOR STUDY DRONE BARD C. (Apr. 
21, 2014), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/burdens-war-crews-drone-aircraft/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7BVT-JJT4]. 
20 See CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT & HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT COLUM. LAW 
SCH., THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES 19–27 (2012); Conor Friedersdorf,‘Every Person Is 
Afraid of the Drones’: The Strikes’ Effect on Life in Pakistan, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/every-person-is-afraid-of-the-
drones-the-strikes-effect-on-life-in-pakistan/262814/ [https://perma.cc/5EP6-QEMC]; Chris 
Woods, ‘Drones Causing Mass Trauma Among Civilians,’ Major Study Finds, BUREAU 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012 
/09/25/drones-causing-mass-trauma-among-civilians-major-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/ 
R9SC-3PE4]. 
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operated by human beings—whether U.S. military personnel or C.I.A. agents—then 
concern regarding AWS is significantly amplified. 
 
The disclosure about civilian deaths and the executive order, the subject 
of months of bureaucratic deliberations, carried broader significance. 
Issued about seven months before Mr. Obama leaves office, the order 
further institutionalized and normalized airstrikes outside conventional 
war zones as a routine part of 21st-century national security policy.21 
 
The admittedly long quote below from the White House Fact Sheet is of great 
relevance to this Article. Rhetoric and language aside—whether convincing is an 
open question—the document articulates how the U.S. drone policy is implemented 
and its consequences. Whether the purpose of the Fact Sheet was to impress upon 
critics that standards exist and are applied or to mollify concerned voices regarding 
limited civilian deaths is a matter of interpretation.  
What stands out for our purposes is the terminology—semantics of warfare—
regarding legitimate targets. In other words, who is targetable and what are the 
criteria for determining whether that person is now a legitimate target based on 
standards of certainty?  
Flourishing language aside, that decision point is extraordinarily nuanced and 
subject to a remarkable number of vectors. As troubling as the document is regarding 
standards of accountability, relevant terminology, and civilian deaths, concern is 
magnified when recognizing that AWS suggest an inherently murky model will be 
devoid of human control and oversight.  
 
The relevant section of the Fact Sheet states as follows: 
 
In May 2013, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) 
that, among other things, set forth policy standards for U.S. direct action 
outside the United States and outside areas of active hostilities. These 
policy standards generally include that the United States will use lethal 
force only against a target that poses a ‘continuing, imminent threat to U.S. 
persons,’ and that direct action will be taken only if there is ‘near certainty’ 
that the terrorist target is present and ‘near certainty’ that non-combatants 
will not be killed or injured. As the President has said, the ‘near certainty’ 
standard is the ‘highest standard we can set.’ 
 
																																																						
21 Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, U.S. Reveals Death Toll from Airstrikes Outside War 
Zones, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/us-reveals-
death-toll-from-airstrikes-outside-of-war-zones.html [https://perma.cc/34JY-WDJ3]; see 
also Scott Shane, Drone Strike Statistics Answer Few Questions, and Raise Many, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/world/middleeast/drone-strike-
statistics-answer-few-questions-and-raise-many.html?emc=edit_th_20160704&nl=todays 
headlines&nlid=59850316&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/R77R-3X2M] (questioning the value of 
statistics to evaluate the effectiveness of drone strikes). 
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Thus, unlike terrorist organizations, which deliberately target civilians and 
violate the law of armed conflict, the United States takes great care to 
adhere to the law of armed conflict and, in many circumstances, applies 
policy standards that offer protections for civilians that exceed the 
requirements of the law of armed conflict. Moreover, even when the 
United States is not operating under the PPG—for example, when the 
United States is taking action in ‘areas of active hostilities,’ such as it is 
today in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, or when the United States is acting 
quickly to defend U.S. or partner forces from attack—the United States 
goes to extraordinary lengths to minimize the risk of civilian casualties. 
 
In particular, in dealing with enemy forces that do not wear uniforms or 
carry their arms openly, the United States goes to great lengths to apply 
the fundamental law of armed conflict principle of distinction, which, 
among other things, requires that attacks be directed only against military 
objectives and not against civilians and civilian objects. The United States 
considers all available information about a potential target’s current and 
historical activities to inform an assessment of whether the individual is a 
lawful target. For example, an individual may be targetable if the 
individual is formally or functionally a member of an armed group against 
which we are engaged in an armed conflict. As Administration officials 
have stated publicly, to determine if an individual is a member of an armed 
group, we may look to, among other things: the extent to which the 
individual performs functions for the benefit of the group that are 
analogous to those traditionally performed by members of a country’s 
armed forces; whether that person is carrying out or giving orders to others 
within the group; or whether that person has undertaken certain acts that 
reliably connote meaningful integration into the group. 
 
Before a strike against a terrorist target is considered in any theater, U.S. 
Government personnel review all available information to determine 
whether any of the individuals at the location of the potential strike is a 
non-combatant. A body of standards, methods, techniques, and computer 
modeling, supported by weapons testing data and combat observations, 
informs the analysis as to whether those not specifically targeted would 
likely be injured or killed in a strike.22 
 
																																																						
22 See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: EXECUTIVE 
ORDER ON THE US POLICY ON PRE & POST-STRIKE MEASURES TO ADDRESS CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES IN THE US OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE & THE DNI RELEASE OF 
AGGREGATE DATA ON STRIKE OUTSIDE AREA OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/fact-sheet-executive-order-us-
policy-pre-post-strike-measures-address [https://perma.cc/37XK-5GSP]. 
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An autonomous warfare regime not subject to limits, criteria, and 
accountability is, perhaps, tactically enticing. Strategically, however, it is unviable 
and unacceptable whether in a court of law or the court of public opinion. I do not 
share the enthusiasm of those who articulate benefits accruing from an autonomous 
warfare paradigm predicated on autonomous systems. I should note my hesitation is 
not predicated on disfavor with the use of power nor does my discomfort reflect not 
recognizing the legitimacy of targeting individuals who pose an imminent unjust 
threat to innocent individuals. 
My concern is quite the opposite: a reflection of decisions in which I have been 
involved has led to a deeply ingrained belief that the decision to kill another human 
being cannot be “fobbed” off to machines, no matter how sophisticated and 
impressive. My belief rests on a values system that places exclusive responsibility 
for the decision to kill another human being on a human being. 
To create an alternative system where that momentous, irreversible decision is 
made and implemented by a machine is the height of abdication of responsibility by 
decision makers. It is problematic from both an ethical and practical standpoint. 
Ethical because the essence of command is decision making reflecting 
accountability; practical because the “go/no go” decision point requires human 
sensitivity to the consequences of a mistaken decision. 
Professor Ronald C. Arkin, a roboticist from Georgia Tech, has written:  
 
[T]he pressure of an increasing battlefield tempo is forcing autonomy 
further and further towards the point of robots making that final, lethal 
decision. The time available to make the decision to shoot or not to shoot 
is becoming too short for remote humans to make intelligent, informed 
decisions in many situations that arise in modern warfare. As that time 
dwindles, robots will likely be given more authority to make lethal 
decisions on their own.23 
 
Intentionally or unintentionally, Arkin has articulated the dangers posed by 
autonomous warfare. The suggestion that “robots will likely be given more authority 
to make lethal decisions on their own” greatly unsettles me. The question is the 
extent to which human decision making will be minimized. 
Professor Arkin has written:  
 
It is my contention that robots can be built that do not exhibit fear, anger, 
frustration, or revenge, and that ultimately (and the key word here is 
ultimately) behave in a more humane manner than even human beings in 
these harsh circumstances and severe duress. People have not evolved to 
function in these conditions, but robots can be engineered to function well 
in them.24 
																																																						
23 Ronald C. Arkin, Ethical Robots in Warfare, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG., Spring 
2009, at 30. 
24 Id. at 31. 
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That premise holds much promise and optimism regarding robotic, or autonomous, 
warfare. The question at hand is whether application of a nation-state’s decision to 
implement a killing policy should be subject to human decision making premised on 
principles of accountability or be driven by autonomous weapons systems devoid of 
human input or interaction.25 
 
II.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DECISION MAKING 
 
The lack of clearly defined terms raises important concerns. Experience 
suggests that wiggle room, the inevitable consequence of amorphousness, results in 
significant violations of international law.26 In particular, a lack of clarity regarding 
imminent threat and legitimate target suggests a national security paradigm 
minimizing protections of individual rights and protections. The concept of balance, 
which I believe is essential to a national security policy predicated on the rule of 
law, is dependent on state agents’ respect for the individual while engaged in 
aggressive operational counterterrorism. 
Balancing is an oft-used expression; I am of the opinion that individual rights 
must be balanced with national security obligations. The two are equally 
legitimate—one does not have preference over the other. The challenge for 
operational decision makers is how to respect both while protecting innocent 
civilians. That is enormously complicated, requiring sensitivity, recognition of 
nuance, and the maturity to “hold fire” when the risk of collateral damage is 
unreasonably high. 
A decision-making model not predicated on these standards reflects a paradigm 
devoid of balance. At its core, operational counterterrorism reflects decision making 
intended to protect innocent civilians. This is in accordance with the nation-state’s 
primary obligation to protect its civilian population.  
However, that does not imply a carte blanche authority to engage any individual 
or group suspected of posing a threat to national security, whether broadly or 
narrowly defined. The state’s critical burden is ascertaining the threat’s imminence. 
Doing so requires assessing and applying international law principles of 
proportionality, necessity, collateral damage, and alternatives.  
The legal foundation for operational counterterrorism is application of self-
defense principles as articulated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. This is 
“application by analogy.” The U.N. Charter was established in order to regulate 
interaction amongst nation-states, rather than between nation-states and nonstate 
																																																						
25 Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre, Meaningful Human Control in Weapon 
Systems: A Primer 7–10 (Mar. 2015) (working paper), https://www.cnas.org/publications/ 
reports/meaningful-human-control-in-weapon-systems-a-primer [https://perma.cc/KJ5M-
8TY7].  
26 Peter Margulies, Making Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command 
Responsibility for Computer-Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON REMOTE WARFARE  (Jens David Ohlin ed., 2016).  
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actors. Nevertheless, the principles are applicable to nation-states conducting 
conflict in accordance with, and subject to, standards of lawful self-defense.  
Self-defense is not unlimited—its legality depends on its application. 
Unrestrained self-defense conducted devoid of standards, limits, and criteria would 
run afoul of international law. That is the case regardless whether the nation-state is 
in conflict with another nation-state or with nonstate actors. 
According to the United Nations Charter, Article 51: “Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”27 
Regarding self-defense which reflects the confluence between operational 
counterterrorism, decision making, and accountability I have previously written: 
“[U]nder what circumstances and subject to what conditions can a commander order 
a military unit to preemptively attack an identified enemy. The critical variable in 
this discussion is how ‘identified’ the enemy has to be. Perhaps the question can best 
be phrased as ‘how certain is certain?’”28 
The policy and legal discussions must provide the commander and decision 
maker with concrete responses to these questions. Otherwise, not only will the 
enemy continue to be unseen, but the guidelines will be unseen as well. That 
combination—in the context of operational counterterrorism—is unworkable.  
 
A ‘who, what, when’ analysis of preemptive self-defense will enable the 
commander and decisionmaker to better understand who the enemy is. 
This analysis inherently presupposes that the nation-state may act; it does 
not, however, suggest that the nation-state may always act. The proposed 
model explicitly involves limits—after all, the essence of the rule of law 
paradigm is an inherent limit on state power. In the self-defense debate, 
the critical questions are what are those restraints, when can the nation-
state act, against what target, and who is the enemy.29 
 
My experience in targeted killing highlights the requirement for articulated criteria 
and a rigorous decision-making process. My decisions were based on application of 
a checklist that sought—under time sensitive circumstances—to minimize error and 
ensure that the person identified by the intelligence community was indeed “that” 
person.  
Checklists are guidelines: They provide important contours and boundaries for 
the decision maker. They do not, however, provide all the answers. The essence of 
decision making is real-time assessment, integrating numerous vector points of 
fluctuating importance. While checklists are essential, they do not serve as the final 
																																																						
27 U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1.   
28 Amos N. Guiora, Self-Defense - From the Wild West to 9/11: Who, What, When, 41 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 638 (2008) (citation omitted). 
29 Id.  
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determinant. The checklist is a critical tool but does not resolve the targeted killing 
dilemma. 
That, however, is not intended to diminish their importance. It is to emphasize 
that there can be no effective substitute for the commander’s decision making based 
on integration of all relevant information. Checklists are intended to facilitate threat 
analysis and to assess availability of operationally viable alternatives.  
The intelligence community works tirelessly to gather and analyze information. 
For example, operators determine where best to conduct the attack, policy analysts 
weigh geopolitical consequences, lawyers assess whether the policy in general and 
as it pertains to a specific hit are conducted in accordance with international law, 
and “explainers” prepare statements and explanations in case an operation results in 
negative consequences.  
All participants, efforts, and resources are focused on one thing—
implementation of a decision to kill an individual. This is reflective of a goal-driven 
process. Success is binary: either the individual deemed a legitimate target is killed 
or not. Failure is more complicated: An attack that results in collateral damage, 
regardless of the actual number of innocent civilians killed, requires explanation, 
potentially results in retribution, and can lead to more far-reaching decisions. The 
essence of targeted killing is implementation of government policy to kill a 
legitimate target believed to pose an imminent threat to national security.  
The legality and morality of the policy and its implementation requires a 
process in which the commander is the final decision maker. For that reason, 
process—with the ultimate decision by an accountable human being—is a requisite 
element of a targeted killing decision. This is significantly different from the “out of 
the loop” paradigm whereby the application is devoid of human decision making 
and accountability. 
There is a significant difference between a human-based process and an AWS-
based process. The former is predicated on individual assessment of innumerable 
real-time variables, where the latter reflects decision making predicated on computer 
modeling devoid of human involvement and accountability at the decision-making 
point.  
Specificity is dependent on process; without developing and implementing a 
process-based targeted killing policy, it is nigh impossible to attack specific targets. 
Targeted killing decision making highlights process and the centrality of command 
responsibility and accountability. Legal justification for a targeted killing is 
predicated on a theory of preemptive self-defense. The consequences of the decision 
were clear to all parties involved in the decision-making process: If the decision 
maker determined that the individual posed an imminent threat to national security 
and nonlethal neutralization was not operationally feasible, then killing the 
individual was deemed legal.  
The four charts below illustrate the complexity of targeted killing analysis. 
They are intended to highlight the disparate aspects of the decision-making process, 
thereby casting doubt on the viability of AWS. Rearticulated, the charts below 
capture the nuance, subtlety, and sensitivity required to analyze inherently subjective 
information. 
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In addition, the checklist was intended to ascertain that the threat posed was, 
indeed, imminent and alternatives to mitigating the threat were not operationally 
feasible. The checklist—and the dilemmas it highlights—reinforce the importance 
of a human being analyzing the distinct factors integral to a “kill/not kill” decision. 
It is an open question whether the significant number of nuanced vectors and 
decision points in a targeted killing paradigm can be sufficiently analyzed by an 
autonomous weapons system.  
Checklists are effective and important with respect to “codifying” both the 
human thought process and decision making. The institutionalized, systematic 
approach to operational counterterrorism—facilitated by checklists—significantly 
contributes to enhancing a systemic process seeking to minimize error while 
ensuring final decisions are subject to human discretion and analysis.  
This is significantly facilitated by command hierarchies, direct lines of 
responsibility, consequences for mistakes, and institutionalized “lessons learned.” 
This is distinct from the AWS paradigm—regardless of the loop model applied—
for it leaves the final decision making in human hands. That model is significantly 
enhanced by a systematic process. 
The decision-making process is fraught with tension and anxiety—the margin 
for error is razor thin. “Hit” too early and standards of self-defense are violated; a 
“no” decision may enable the actor to go unscathed and result in the deaths of 
innocent civilians; “hitting” after the act may violate international law norms 
regarding revenge and retribution.  
There are four distinct degrees of threats; operational decision making requires 
assessing each threat to determine which—if any—counterterrorism measure should 
be applied. The threat categories facilitate and determinine the degree of imminence 
and whether the identified or suspected threat poses an immediate danger. To act 
before the threat is viable would violate articulated standards of legitimate self-
defense.  
Determining the legitimacy of a targeted killing requires assessing when the 
threat becomes sufficiently viable to order the “hit.” The four degrees are as follows: 
 
Table 1: Threat Degree Categories 
 
 Characteristics 
Imminent 
threats 
Threats that will be acted upon shortly and about which a lot 
of detail is known. 
Foreseeable 
Threats 
Threats that will be carried out in the near future (with no 
specificity). These threats are slightly more remote than those 
that are imminent. 
Long-Range 
Threats 
Threats that may reach fruition at an unknown time. 
Uncertain 
Threats 
Threats that invoke general fears of insecurity. 
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Assessing whether the intelligence information is actionable requires applying the 
four-part intelligence test below. Integral to that analysis is determining the 
reliability of the intelligence source. 
 
Table 2: Test for Intelligence Reliability 
 
Commanders must also determine if the source is biased and reliable when 
determining whether the information is actionable. To do so, one should consider 
the following: 
 
Table 3: Test for Flaws in Information from Human Sources 
Source Bias and Reliability 
• What is the source’s background, and how does that affect the information 
provided? 
• Does the source have a grudge/personal “score” to settle based either on a 
past personal or family relationship with the person the information targets or 
identifies? 
• What are the risks to the source if the targeted individual is targeted? 
• What are the risks to the source if the intelligence is made public? 
 
In addition, the final chart illustrates the requisite analysis regarding the target. 
  
Test Prong Definition/Use 
Reliability Past experiences show the source to be a dependable provider of 
correct information; requires discerning whether the information 
is useful and accurate; demands analysis by the case officer 
whether the source has a personal agenda/grudge with respect to 
the person identified/targeted. 
Viability Is it possible that an attack could occur in accordance with the 
source’s information? i.e., the information provided by the 
source indicates a terrorist attack that could take place within the 
realm of the possible and feasible. 
Relevance The information has bearing on upcoming events; consider both 
the timeliness of the information and whether it is time sensitive 
imposing the need for an immediate counterterrorism measure. 
Corroboration Another source (who meets the reliability test above) confirms 
the information in whole or part. 
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Table 4: Test to Determine Whether Target is Legitimate 
Target 
• What is the person’s role in the terrorist organization? 
• What insight can the source provide regarding “impact”? 
• What are the risks/cost-benefits if the targeted killing is delayed? 
• Does it justify immediate action?  Or is the information insufficient to 
justify a targeted killing but significant enough to justify other measures, 
including detention (subject to operational considerations)? 
 
Effective and lawful operational counterterrorism depends on the ability to 
determine that a particular individual poses a threat. That is the essence of self-
defense, regardless of how it may be defined. Whether a potential is a threat in fact 
requires an analysis of an extensive number and fluctuating degree of factors. 
 
III.  IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS IN PRACTICE 
 
International law imposes on commanders the obligation to conduct 
operational counterterrorism subject to the four questions below:30 
 
 1. Is the proposed action one of military necessity? 
 2. Is the proposed action proportional to the threat posed? 
 3. Are there no other viable alternatives to the proposed action? 
 4. Does the proposed action limit the amount of collateral damage? 
 
According to the Caroline Doctrine, self-defense is limited to situations where 
the “necessity of self-defence [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation,”31 and any action taken must be proportional 
“since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that 
necessity, and kept clearly within it.”32 One of the most important limits on the 
exercise of state power is that a potential attack be defined as imminent.  
																																																						
30 See Marco Sassoli, Legitimate Targets of Attacks Under International Humanitarian 
Law, HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. RES. INITIATIVE (Jan. 27–29, 2003), http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/Session1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VPW-4J3K]; Michael N. Schmitt, 
Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the 
Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 804 (2010); Military Necessity, INT’L COMMITTEE 
RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-glossary.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LL97-U4HZ]; Customary IHL, Practice Relating to Rule 14. 
Proportionality in Attack, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter4_rule14 [https://perma.cc/7LVZ-H4WG].  
31 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Special 
Minister (July 27, 1842), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp#web1 
[https://perma.cc/XK5G-9LDQ]. 
32 Id.  
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Counterterrorism rooted in the rule of law must be particularly sensitive to 
limits and standards. The former reflects appropriate use of state power, while the 
latter reflects measures and means that can be applied to achievable lawful means. 
In order to appreciate the danger inherent to a system devoid of accountability, it is 
necessary to engage in discussion regarding a system predicated on accountability.33  
The chart below examines four distinct incidents, highlighting the 
consequences faced by those responsible for the decisions that resulted in collateral 
damage. Those consequences are the essence of accountability necessarily at the 
core of human decision making. While some have called for greater punishment for 
those responsible, the chart reflects that decision making resulting in the 
unwarranted loss of innocent life has consequences. 
  
																																																						
33 See Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding Exceptional 
Incidents that Occurred During Operation ‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 2, IDF MILITARY 
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.mag.idf.il/261-6958-
en/Patzar.aspx [https://perma.cc/82WZ-F7PB] (explaining allegations of misconduct, and 
the process for investigating that misconduct, and the results of investigations); Decisions of 
the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding Exceptional Incidents During Operation 
‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 3, IDF MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS (March 22, 
2015), http://www.mag.idf.il/163-7183-en/Patzar.aspx [https://perma.cc/7HPZ-WCLL]; 
Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding Exceptional Incidents that 
Allegedly Occurred During Operation ‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 4, IDF MILITARY 
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS (June 11, 2015), http://www.law.idf.il/163-7353-
en/Patzar.aspx [https://perma.cc/N3QU-N2JS]; Mossad Hit Team’s Big Mistake: 40 Years 
Ago, Wrong Man Killed in Norway – New Reflections, SPIES AGAINST ARMAGEDDON (July 
1, 2013), http://israelspy.com/mossad-hit-teams-big-mistake-40-years-ago-wrong-man-
killed-in-norway-new-reflections/ [https://perma.cc/DQ4G-VZ98]. 
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Party Date & Incident Details Outcome 
Israeli 
Defense 
Force (IDF) 
July 8 – August 
26, 2014 
Operation 
“Protective 
Edge” 
During the suspension 
of the Gaza ceasefire, 
the IDF conducted 
numerous military 
operations in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.  
The MAG (Military 
Advocate General) 
assesses all claims 
filed with the office for 
war crime and criminal 
liability and strives to 
investigate every 
incident fully. 
 
Hundreds of claims are 
investigated and, 
among those, a very 
small percentile are 
ever recommended for 
prosecutorial 
consideration. 
Allegations range vastly 
across the criminal spectrum 
– from looting to improper 
killings of civilians – and 
seldom do they result in 
convictions.  The MAG’s 
procedural protections and 
investigatory methods are 
largely criticized as 
incubating soldiers from 
responsibility for their 
actions while on mission.  
Mossad 
(Israeli 
National 
Intelligence 
Agency) 
 
July 21, 1973 
“Lillehammer 
Affair” 
(attempted 
assassination of 
Ali Hassan 
Salameh) 
 
Misleading intel led 
Israeli agents to kill 
the wrong target, 
instead resulting in the 
death of a civilian 
Moroccan immigrant.  
It was later revealed 
that agency personnel 
knew their source was 
unreliable. 
The Israel Government has 
never admitted its 
involvement (though former 
agents have come forward).  
 
In 1996, Israel agreed to pay 
$400,000 in compensation 
to the surviving wife and 
son of the slain. 
United 
States Air 
Force 
October 3, 
2015 
“Doctors 
Without 
Borders” 
Bombing in 
Kunduz, 
Afghanistan 
U.S. military 
incidentally bombs a 
hospital in 
Afghanistan, resulting 
in the deaths of 42 
persons and wounding 
30 more. 
 
The U.S. military 
initially suggests the 
attack was intended to 
defend U.S. ground 
forces before insisting 
that the strike was 
 
President Barack Obama 
issued a formal apology and 
announced the U.S. would 
make condolence payments 
to the families of those 
killed in the airstrike.  Three 
investigations were later 
conducted by NATO, a joint 
U.S.-Afghan group, and the 
U.S. Department of Defense 
(whose findings were 
released on April 29, 2016). 
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The contrast between the two—an accountability paradigm with clear lines of 
command as distinguished from a paradigm whose lines of command and 
accountability are unclear—is troubling. It requires resolution given the increasing 
favor with which autonomous warfare is viewed. By clear lines of accountability I 
refer to the example of current accountability models as enforced by the military, 
with any decisions clearly delineated back to those responsible should error occur.  
If faulty intelligence leads to a strike on a civilian target, the intelligence 
analysts are to blame. If solid intelligence leads to a erroneous strike on a civilian 
target, perhaps the targeting military operator is to blame.  
This is not to say that computers and automated systems should not play any 
role within the decision-making process. If there are algorithms or platforms that 
can expediate or finepoint any part of the decision-making process, then surely any 
military can and should benefit from such a dual partnership. However, it is my 
assertion that this sort of a partnership can never be replaced by computers alone.  
To consistently effectuate lawful targeted killings, I created a decision-making 
tree intended to ensure the final determination incorporated relevant variables in the 
invariably limited “window of opportunity.” The questions created many “forks in 
the road.” Every answer lends itself to additional questions. 
 
1. Is the commander on the ground and able to assess the situation 
himself? 
2. Is the potential target acting in a suspicious manner? 
3. Is the military unit capable of successfully completing the targeted 
killing? 
requested by Afghan 
Forces.  
 
Cockpit recordings 
show the AC-130 
operators questioned 
the legality of the 
operation. 
Médecins Sans 
Frontières/Doctors Without 
Borders has called for an 
independent probe, arguing 
the forces who conducted 
the airstrike cannot be 
entrusted to investigate the 
incident impartially. 
NATO – 
Colonel 
Klein &  
1st Sergeant 
Wilhelm 
(Germany) 
September 4, 
2009 
 
Air strike near 
Kunduz, 
Afghanistan 
Two tanker trucks 
immobilized on a 
sandbank were struck 
by NATO bombers, 
resulting in up to 142 
casualties, many of 
which were civilians.  
 
No warning of an 
attack was issued to 
bystanders and no 
explanation of the 
military aim has ever 
been provided. 
All charges against the two 
officers were dismissed by 
the German Federal 
Prosecutor in 2010, who 
concluded that the actions 
were not culpable under 
either International Law or 
the German Criminal Code. 
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4. What are the geopolitical consequences of engaging in a targeted 
killing of that person at that time? 
5. Does it meet the international law test? Proportionality, military 
necessity, collateral damage, alternatives? 
 
Variable assessment depends on “reading” complex operational situations. 
Invariably, mistakes can be made when human decision making incorporates 
subjective and objective vector points. Analyzing available information is, naturally, 
dependent on gathering information. As discussed above, determining whether 
intelligence information is “actionable” requires the application of a four-part test 
requiring analysis of received information received and its source. The two—
information and source—are intertwined.  
The charts in Section III highlight the extraordinary complexity of operational 
counterterrorism, in particular the human factor in the decision-making process. 
The burden imposed—and obligation mandated—on soldiers and commanders 
engaged in operational counterterrorism is to apply norms of proportionality and 
distinction when assessing the legality of a proposed attack.  
The principle of distinction—the differentiation between nonparticipant and 
participant civilians and, therefore, potentially, a legitimate target—is of particular 
importance when examining autonomous warfare. Proportionality imposes on the 
nation-state obligations of restraint and avoiding excess when engaging an identified 
legitimate target.  
Failure to correctly assess these factors results in tragedy and violations of 
international law. The question is whether assessments can be made by machine 
rather than by humans. Rearticulated, is the autonomous warfare paradigm an 
acceptable substitute to commanders presently tasked with assessing intelligence 
information prior to engagement? 
Commanders choosing to act on available information are subject to two 
important caveats—corroborating that information provided by the source is reliable 
and verifying that alternatives to threat mitigation are operationally unfeasible. Most 
importantly, they are accountable for their decisions. 
The Israel Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, addressed this 
issue in The Public Committee against Torture in Israel vs. The Government of 
Israel.34
 
 In his seminal decision, President (Chief Justice) Barak wrote the following 
regarding identification of the legitimate target:  
  
																																																						
34 HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of 
Israel (2005) (Isr.), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Israel/Targetted_Killings 
_Supreme_Court_13-12-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6GP-26A5]. 
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On the one hand, a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities one single 
time, or sporadically, who later detaches himself from that activity, is a 
civilian who, starting from the time he detached himself from that activity, 
is entitled to protection from attack. He is not to be attacked for the 
hostilities which he committed in the past.35 
 
Regarding protection of innocent civilians Barak wrote:  
 
The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts 
of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the 
army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians 
‘for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities (§51(3) of The First 
Protocol). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, 
on the condition that there is no other less harmful means, and on the 
condition that innocent civilians nearby are not harmed. Harm to the latter 
must be proportionate. That proportionality is determined according to a 
values based test, intended to balance between the military advantage and 
the civilian damage. As we have seen, we cannot determine that a 
preventative strike is always legal, just as we cannot determine that it is 
always illegal. All depends upon the question whether the standards of 
customary international law regarding international armed conflict allow 
that preventative strike or not.36 
 
The above represents the essence of Israel’s targeted killing policy that I was 
involved in. Much of my perception of the issue is informed by this experience. 
While I have no field experience with autonomous warfare, I am intimately familiar 
with the consequences of a decision intended to result in the death of human being.  
The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice—carefully and 
in an extraordinarily nuanced manner—parsed the definition of words critical to this 
discussion. Barak’s opinions regarding the limits of state power emphasized the 
requirement to balance individual rights with national security.37 That is the essence 
of a democracy regardless of the nature of the “foe”; failing to robustly balance 
undermines the legitimacy of state action. Similarly, Barak was of the controversial 
opinion that the nation-state must fight terrorism with “one arm tied behind its back” 
by engaging in self-imposed restraints.  
Applying principles of balancing and self-imposed restraints in the context of 
complex decision making is predicated on a significant number of critical 
parameters including questions of law, morality, effectiveness, and geopolitics. The 
question is whether autonomous warfare systems are simultaneously capable of 
protecting individual rights while engaging in preemptive operational 
counterterrorism when decision making demands extraordinary nuance. 
																																																						
35 Id. at ¶ 39. 
36 Id. at ¶ 60.  
37 See Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security, 85 NEB. L. REV. 454, 502 (2006).  
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Autonomous warfare is a viscerally exciting concept for a new weapon—or 
strategic undertaking—in warfare.  
While serving as Commander of the IDF’s School of Military Law (IDF SML, 
2001–2004), I had command responsibility for the development of an interactive 
video teaching soldiers an IDF code of conduct, with particular emphasis on their 
interaction with the Palestinian civilian population.38 
The video became the subject of intensive Israeli and international attention 
and was picked up by multiple media outlets.  I was repeatedly asked the following 
questions: Why make the video? Can you teach morality? How do you determine 
effectiveness? The concept of teaching morality is rife with controversy—any 
discussion is vigorous and spirited. 
I felt soldiers could be taught to conduct themselves morally with the caveat 
that the instruction creatively challenge them. In this respect, they were adopting my 
moralistic dogma while also applying it to their own conscience, being, and future 
actions. Senior IDF leadership accepted my position on attempting to codify and 
teach certain aspects of morality, thus producing the pedagogy of the video. 
Regarding evidence of effectiveness, I cannot point to empirical 
demonstrations of success or failure. Simply put, “successful” morality, or even a 
change in a person’s morality, is not a binary success/failure equation that can be 
proven. I can, however, reference feedback we received from NGOs who noted 
positive changes in soldier interaction with Palestinians after the introduction of the 
video. 
My reasons for implementing the video can best be explained two-fold: A 
military in a democracy must act morally, and innumerable complaints filed by 
human rights organizations regarding conduct/misconduct of IDF soldiers at 
checkpoints, primarily in the West Bank, highlighted a systemic problem. 
Someone—I do not recall who—brought to my attention a term used in the U.S. 
military, “the strategic corporal.”39  
I quickly adopted it when meeting with soldiers and commanders and 
discussing the video and checkpoints. I found it a particularly effective metaphor in 
explaining the dramatic impact of significant advancements in technology. The 
onset of handheld mobile phones enabled instant communication between a 
seemingly isolated incident at a checkpoint and the broader international 
community.  
Consequences regarding the court of international opinion were dramatic. The 
need for instant explanation imposed significant burdens on the IDF. More 
importantly, visuals enabled us to better understand particular events: Where 
soldiers needed to be punished, punishment was meted out; where Palestinian 
reports of soldier misconduct were shown to be incorrect, it greatly facilitated 
explaining particular events and their broader significance. 
																																																						
38 Amos N. Guiora, Teaching Morality in Armed Conflict: The Israel Defense Forces 
Model, 18 JEWISH POL. STUD. REV. 3, 3 (2006).  
39 Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, 
MARINES CORPS GAZETTE, Jan. 1999, at 18–22. 
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The reality of instant communication required the corporal address the 
operational question at hand with greater sensitivity. A worldwide audience could 
be privy to his decision making in real time. It was increasingly difficult to hide 
behind traditional responses that information is being gathered and will be studied 
in due time. The event was readily accessible to anyone with a TV, much less a 
computer. 
To enhance the corporal’s decision making capabilities, a number of initiatives 
were undertaken, including creation of a new position: Check Point Commander 
(“CPC”) and a training program with the specific purpose of preparing individuals 
for this position. The video was an integral part of both. What is important is that 
the concept of “strategic corporal” emphasized individual accountability and 
responsibility.  
I am particularly taken by Professor Heather Roff’s term, “The Strategic 
Robot.” More than any other articulation of this phenomenon, Professor Roff’s has 
deeply influenced my perception of weapons of the future. The term captures the 
most problematic aspect of autonomous warfare. Professor Roff’s term is of 
particular interest to me because it suggests a dramatic transformation from the 
corporal to AWS. The corporal accountability model is universally understood and 
accepted: A soldier “owns” mistakes and is culpable for misconduct. The strategic 
robot model raises questions of profound importance regarding the essence of 
soldiering—accountability and responsibility.  
The lack of current research and discussion regarding accountability as it 
pertains to AWS either suggests it has not yet been questioned or that there will be 
a penchant for lack of transparency. As I discuss below, that gap is deeply troubling. 
The “strategic robot” reflects a paradigm shift reflecting the future of military 
engagement. The consequences are of utmost importance to military commanders, 
national security decision makers, public officials, and the broader public.  
The juxtaposition of the two words—“strategic” and “robot”—suggests a 
powerful paradigm shift in how warfare is conducted. The transformation from 
soldier to strategic robot must give us pause. It is not a semantic change but rather a 
substantive shift demanding close scrutiny and skepticism. “Strategic” is distinct 
from “tactical”; the former is an overarching, long-term plan and goal, while the 
latter refers to the short-term implementation and application.  
The shift to a paradigm whereby human decision making is significantly 
limited represents a profound strategic shift. In traditional military engagement 
between nation-states, armies engage with armies; it is the axiomatic “tanks-
tanks/planes-planes” paradigm. Both sides possessed enormous arsenals, with the 
most sophisticated “state of the art” weapons causing massive destruction.  
In the increasingly predominant conflict between state actors and nonstate 
actors, the former possesses overwhelming force. The only question is whether the 
available weapons will be applied in accordance with international law and the self-
imposed restraints previously referenced.  
The shift is a direct product of the onset of the age of terrorism and the end of 
conflict between nation-states. This is an extraordinary geopolitical and geostrategic 
transformation with profound consequences. The shift requires a rearticulation of 
418 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
	
goals, purposes, and missions particularly because many targets and enemies operate 
without uniforms, borders, or limits themselves. One of the inevitable ramifications 
is the development and adoption of weapons that enable the nation-state to narrow 
the focus of engagement to a particular individual or group of individuals.  
While the operational focus of counterterrorism is far narrower than traditional 
military engagement, the question is what that shift tolerates regarding decision 
making in AWS. More precisely, the inquiry involves whether this profound change 
need result in the minimization of human involvement in the decision-making 
process. That, in many ways, is the essence of autonomous warfare favoring 
“humans out of the loop” as compared to contemporary counterterrorism driven by 
“humans in the loop.”  
The “humans in the loop” model also applies to traditional warfare. There is, 
then, greater similarity between traditional warfare and operational counterterrorism 
than between the latter and autonomous warfare. The emphasis on “humans out of 
the loop” is unique to autonomous warfare; both traditional warfare and operational 
counterterrorism emphasize human decision making predicated on accountability 
and responsibility. 
The long-term consequences of this proposed new normal go well beyond the 
introduction of an improved weapons system or a tactical shift in combat theory and 
practice. If indeed the strategic robot truly emerges as the new weapon of choice, it 
will be arguably the most significant change in warfare in centuries. Whether it is 
the most significant transformation in the history of human conflict-engagement is 
the subject of a different inquiry. 
What is relevant, however, is addressing, and, ultimately, determining whether 
standards, criteria, and accountability inherent to operational counterterrorism 
rooted in the rule of law are transferable to this newly developing “human out of the 
loop” autonomous warfare. 
 
IV.  ENSURING COMPLIANCE 
 
The difference in the proposed paradigms is the means by which an individual 
is killed. Given the seeming tenuousness between human decision making and 
autonomous warfare, accountability standards must be stricter than in the existing 
means of killing a supposedly legitimate target.  In traditional military engagement, 
the essence of command responsibility is accountability for all actions and their 
results. It is essential that a similar model be applied to autonomous warfare.  
According to the European Parliament, Directorate-General for External 
Policies, Policy Department report on Human Rights Implications of the Usage of 
Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare:  
 
The fundamental principle that governmental power and authority must be 
exercised in accordance with clear, legitimate and enforceable rules lies 
not only at the heart of liberal democracies—it encapsulates the very 
essence of the rule of law. . . . Transparency and accountability must be 
taken particularly seriously when States resort to lethal force as a matter 
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of foreign policy. . . . At the most basic level, legal accountability requires 
the recognition that States remain legally responsible for the consequences 
of their use of robotic weapons irrespective of the operational autonomy 
achieved by such systems.40 
 
The troubling nature of autonomous warfare is manifested by the clear desire 
to minimize human involvement in its application. That raises significant concern 
because the human element is essential to fully informed decision making when 
killing is the stated objective. To remove the human element from ascertaining the 
extent to which a person poses an imminent threat is to create a paradigm whereby 
nuance and subtlety are largely eviscerated. Computers cannot process, much less 
resolve, grey areas as this is the essence of human judgement. In essence, if you plug 
X question into a computer, it is going to be programmed to respond YES or NO, 
not MAYBE, and this is what you find problematic, because sometimes “maybe” or 
“depends” or “perhaps” is the best possible answer to a given question. How do you 
program morality into a computer? What kind of morality do you use? To which 
ethicist are you prescribing a doctrine? 
The reliance on autonomous systems as “decision makers” has raised 
objections that Professors Ken Anderson and Matthew Waxman correctly 
summarize as: “The third objection [to robotic warfare, ANG] holds that 
autonomous weapons systems that remove the human being from the firing loop are 
unacceptable because they undermine the possibility of holding anyone accountable 
for what, if done by a human soldier, might be a war crime.”41 
Implementing robust accountability standards and criteria is “at risk” when 
decision making has been largely removed from commanders. Person-specific 
counterterrorism—the specific identification of a particular individual—depends on 
sophisticated analysis of the decision making vectors highlighted in the charts above.  
The application of those vectors in a time-sensitive environment when a 
“kill/not kill” decision is in the balance is, I believe, the greatest challenge to those 
involved in operational counterterrorism. It is the decision point with the greatest 
stakes and most compelling consequences and ramifications.  
Commanders are trained to lead, assess, decide, and assume responsibility for 
consequences of their decisions. The expression “command is lonely” captures the 
essence of accountability for decisions made. The four requirements—leading, 
assessing, deciding, and accountability—are integral to the targeted killing paradigm 
previously addressed.  
A decision-making process rooted in the rule of law and principles of morality 
will implement the charts interspersed throughout this article. Doing so facilitates 
rationale-based decision making which then incorporates these relevant 
																																																						
40 NILS MELZER, POLICY DEP’T, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE USAGE OF DRONES AND UNMANNED ROBOTS IN WARFARE 37 (2013).  
41 Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Policy Review Law and Ethics for Robot 
Soldiers 11 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. Law, Research Paper No. 2012-32) (Columbia Law Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-313, 2012). 
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considerations. The commander’s decision reflects situational awareness, 
circumstantial assessment of “on the ground” realities, previous experience, unit-
capability experience, flexibility-nuance regarding orders received, viability of 
alternatives, “exit” policy, and the capability of successfully accomplishing the 
mission.  
Case in point: An IDF battalion commander42 was given an order to detain 
three suspected terrorists in Nablus. When approaching the city, the commander 
received an urgent update from his intelligence officer that while spotters had 
located the suspected terrorists, they were surrounded by school-age children. The 
commander had, according to his analysis, three options: (1) cancel the mission; (2) 
proceed with the mission, regardless of the consequences to the children; or (3) 
engage in “cat and mouse” with the terrorists. The commander decided to cancel the 
mission. He reasoned that the costs of collateral damage did not outweigh the 
benefits accrued from arresting the three and the mission could be achieved at a later 
date. 
There was, from the commander’s perspective, two-fold accountability—
mission achievement would result in significant collateral damage, while mission 
cancellation would, conceivably, facilitate terrorist escape and enable the local 
community to view the IDF as “weak.”43 
While this example is not directly related to targeted killing it highlights both 
the issue of accountability and the consequence of minimizing, if not eviscerating, 
human input in decision making. There are, as discussed in Section II, distinct 
categories of “humans in the loop” decision-making paradigms integral to 
autonomous warfare. There must be an individual present to exercise discretion 
when determining whether to engage in a targeted killing. 
It goes without saying that mistakes are made in assessing the quality of the 
intelligence received, in perceiving the actions of the identified target, in incorrectly 
determining the imminence of the presumed threat, and in the manner in which the 
attack is conducted. 
While in these instances decisions were implemented without all factors taken 
into careful and thorough consideration, decision makers, to varying degrees, were 
held accountable. Accountability is the essence of command. Command structure is 
dependent on proper delegation of responsibility and accountability. Soldiers and 
commanders alike depend on a command structure that ensures military discipline, 
clear lines of command, and a confirmation of systemic and institutionalized 
principles of accountability and responsibility.  
That is the essence of a military and is essential for mission articulation and 
achievement. Failure to create, and ensure, a clear chain of command raises 
significant concerns regarding the proper functioning of a military unit. The core of 
a military unit is discipline and accountability; the former is the “heart and soul” of 
a military, while the latter ensures consequences for mistakes, intentional or 
otherwise.  
																																																						
42 The commander shared the story with me when I was serving in the IDF. 
43 The decision to “reverse” was witnessed by many Palestinians. 
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The constant in the decision-making tree was command accountability. My 
questions were directed exclusively at the commander; my recommendation was 
dependent on his answers. Those answers were based on his “on the ground” 
assessment reflecting professional experience, military training, understanding of 
the threat posed, recognition of the costs and benefits of undertaking or not 
undertaking the operation, application of international law principles of 
proportionality, distinction, collateral damage, and alternatives. The individual 
soldier bears responsibility for actions taken and commands given. 
I find this process of fundamental importance because the clarity guided me 
throughout my career, both with respect to my actions and those of others. I believe 
my personal experiences and insight can provide valuable input for the vast majority 
of both civilians and military personnel who have never been faced with such 
decisions and may be unable to fathom the complexities that accompany ordering 
the death of another individual. Those same standards of accountability must be 
applied to autonomous warfare decision making and its consequences. There can be 
no middle ground or wiggle room in this matter. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is no doubt that the potential application of autonomous warfare presents 
change. Change in this context is not intended either as a “positive” or a “negative,” 
but instead as the acknowledgment of a new reality viewed favorably by some and 
with extreme distress by others. The primary source of concern focuses on the 
transfer of the decision-making process and issues of responsibility and 
accountability onto artificial intelligence rather than that developed by humans.  
These are profound strategic questions which extend significantly beyond the 
issues of tactics and specific applications. While the targeted killing paradigm raises 
important and complicated questions and concerns, the degree of human 
involvement in the decision-making process has not been raised as a point of 
controversy or opposition. That is why, as suggested above, operational 
counterterrorism—of which targeted killing is but one example—more closely 
resembles traditional military engagement than autonomous warfare.  
The suggestion that AWS are strategic goes to the heart of the issue. By labeling 
it as a strategic entity, the term implies the autonomous system replaces the soldier 
in importance.  
Enhanced robotic warfare utilizes highly technologically advanced AWS to 
significantly minimize human decision making, emphasizing algorithms and 
mathematical modeling in determining when an individual may be targeted for a 
targeted killing. Robotic warfare is undoubtedly seductive. It reduces the presence 
of “boots on the ground.” However, minimization of morality—if not totally 
ignoring its significance—poses an extraordinarily dangerous honeytrap of 
temptation. 
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In warfare, it is a mistake to think that morality stands still. Thinking about 
the ethics of war shifts frequently to accommodate technological change. 
At the beginning of World War I, submarine warfare was considered 
cowardly and inhuman. At the start of World War II, both sides agreed not 
to bomb civilians. In both cases, the sphere of the permissible widened to 
accommodate the realities of the conflict. After Vietnam, some attempt 
was made to incorporate the wholesale slaughter of civilians within a more 
agreeable perspective.44 
 
The concept of morality has evolved over thousands of years. The introduction 
of morality into war and armed conflict is  one of the most fluid and dynamic aspects 
of conflict, oftentimes creating a “gray zone” of questionable application of weapons 
and strategies within the spectrum of armed conflict. Counterterrorism has presented 
similar questions of morality within the broader scope of conflict between 
asymmetrical forces. 
Who is a “civilian” and who are “legitimate targets” are examples of the “gray 
zone” in operational counterterrorism. Decision making regarding application of the 
terms is complicated and sensitive. How AWS, or robots, would “define” and 
“apply” terminology in the context of autonomous warfare is at the crux of the 
dilemma regarding nonhuman decision making. 
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